Why Didn't Germany Attack Turkey During World War II: Exploring Strategic and Political Considerations
The question as to why Germany did not attack Turkey during World War II is one that has puzzled many historians and conspiracy theorists alike. While it is established that Hitler targeted the Soviet Union for access to valuable Caucasian oil fields, there is a perception that Germany could have potentially attacked Turkey to reach the oil rich regions of the Middle East. This article delves into the strategic and political reasons behind this decision, examining geographical, population, and alliance considerations.
Geographical and Operational Challenges
The fact that Turkey is a mountainous country significantly complicates the feasibility of a Blitzkrieg-style attack. Unlike countries like Poland and the Low Countries, which were more suitable for rapid and efficient military maneuvers, Turkey's terrain would have greatly hindered such an assault. This natural geographic disadvantage would have required Germany to adopt a more labor-intensive and slow-moving military approach, making the conquest of Turkey considerably more challenging.
In addition to the mountainous terrain, Turkey's sheer size is another factor. The country covers over 780,000 square kilometers, which is more than twice the size of post-World War II Germany (approximately 375,000 square kilometers). Coupled with its population of nearly 18 million (now over 85 million), controlling such a vast territory would have demanded an immense amount of military resources and manpower. Even without taking into account the increased population, such a military operation would have been a significant logistical and operational challenge.
Political and Alliance Considerations
The political and military dynamics of the period further complicate the likelihood of a German attack on Turkey. Turkey had already aligned itself with the Allies, specifically the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, during the war. This alliance presented a significant strategic risk to Germany, as it would draw additional men and resources away from their existing operational theaters. Such an alliance could potentially have resulted in an earlier defeat of Germany, making the invasion of Turkey an unwise move from a strategic perspective.
Another critical factor is the historical relationship between Germany and Turkey. Despite tensions, Germany and Turkey have often maintained a friendly relationship. Hitler, in particular, entertained the idea of persuading Turkey to join the Axis powers and even considered the country as a potential ally. Opening hostilities with a nation that is, at best, neutral would have been a significant diplomatic and political gamble with little strategic gain. It would be illogical to attack an ally or a friendly neutral to attack an enemy, especially considering the potential backlash from other Axis members.
Strategic Relationships in the Middle East
During the 1930s and early 1940s, Arabs were largely pro-Nazi, with an eagerness to align with the German cause, particularly due to Hitler's aggressive anti-Semitic policies. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, played a significant role in this sentiment. His broadcasts from Germany into Arab nations, urging them to kill Jews on sight, further entrenched this attitude. However, despite this support, attacking such an ally or close associate would have been counterproductive.
The Mufti of Jerusalem was not only a vocal supporter of the Nazi regime but also played a role in raising a Muslim SS army, the SS Handschar, which was later declared a criminal organization at the Nuremberg trials. His interactions and support of Germany and the SS, while significant, should not overshadow the practical and diplomatic consequences of engaging in hostilities with a nation that might have had close ties with other Axis powers.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the decision by Germany not to attack Turkey during World War II can be attributed to several strategic and political factors. Geographical barriers, sheer size and population, alliance commitments with the Allies, and the potential risks of alienating an ally, all contributed to the decision. While the invasion of Turkey would have hypothetically granted access to Middle Eastern oil, the logistical, political, and strategic challenges outweighed any potential benefits.
Thus, the question posed about a possible German attack on Turkey remains a product of historical curiosity rather than a feasible military strategy. The decision by Hitler and the leadership of Germany to focus their efforts on other fronts, such as the Soviet Union and North Africa, was likely a well-calculated strategy that maximized military effectiveness and minimized unnecessary risks.