Introduction
The U.S. occupation of Mexico City from 1847 to 1848 has attracted significant historical interest. The aftermath of this occupation would have been vastly different if the U.S. had chosen to remain there. This article explores how such a scenario might have played out, highlighting the challenges and consequences faced by both the U.S. and Mexico.
Unpredictable Outcomes of Continued Occupation
The U.S. military occupation of Mexico City was by no means uneventful. Unlike recent and total military occupations such as Germany and Japan, the U.S. presence in Mexico was primarily restricted to a few major cities. This reality makes it clear that the U.S. would have found itself in a precarious position if it had remained.
While the U.S. controlled a few major cities, many small towns and villages were resistant to their rule. Local forces would have continued to ambush U.S. patrols and convoys, leading to ever-increasing rebellions and potential consolidations of anti-U.S. popular governments. The hostile environment described above would have required substantial resources to maintain.
Strategic Limitations of U.S. Forces
U.S. strategists were primarily focused on fighting a traditional, regular war. However, they might have faced significant challenges due to the guerrilla tactics employed by the Mexican forces. Mexican armies were more accustomed to small unit tactics, which made them more effective against the U.S. occupation forces.
Guerrilla Warfare vs. Regular Warfare
Take, for example, the northern part of Mexico. After the Battle of Monterrey, Mexican forces retreated to Saltillo after a truce was reached between both sides. Despite being equally exhausted, small and nimble Mexican troops continued to harass U.S. mule trains and their escorts. This guerrilla warfare effectively drained U.S. resources and manpower.
U.S. commanders, such as Zachary Taylor, took swift but extreme actions to suppress these guerrilla tactics. They would burn towns and kill their inhabitants, a strategy known for its highly romanticized Texas Rangers and other militia units. These actions, while effective in the short term, did not win public support and were despised by regular American troops. This shows the limitations of relying solely on strength and force in an occupied territory.
Increasing Rebellions and Hostility
The guerrilla warfare employed by the Mexican forces, particularly General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's decision to stop such operations, resulted in the U.S. mule trains being unmolested. This strengthened the American army and allowed it to fight a drawn-out, attritional battle in Angostura. The eventual cessation of the U.S. advance was due to Winfield Scott's strategy of opening a new front via Veracruz.
The reality of continued occupation would have been a prolonged, bloodier fight that would have been difficult to win. By 1848, one in four American servicemen had died from desertion or were missing. Mexican losses were similarly high. Both sides were exhausted and wary of prolonged conflict, with nine Mexican states still possessing their National Guard militias.
Peace Negotiations and the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty
The negotiation process for peace was complex and fraught with tension. Mexican representatives were wary of U.S. presence and the threat of a popular uprising. Rapid exhaustion of Mexican forces would have made it easier for the remaining units to join a potential uprising. The U.S. representatives, notably Winfield Scott, urged for a swift treaty to end the occupation and leave the country as soon as possible.
Signing the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty hastily was the wisest decision made by the negotiators. This treaty, signed in 1848, ended the Mexican-American War and brought a conclusion to the U.S. occupation of Mexico City, averting a potentially more hostile and destructive outcome.
Conclusion
The hypothetical scenario of the U.S. remaining in Mexico City after 1848 would have led to a dangerous and extended conflict, characterized by guerrilla warfare and increasing resistance. The reality of such an occupation would have resulted in a prolonged and costly struggle, likely ending with the same treaty as under negotiation. The key takeaway is that the negotiated peace was the logical and strategic decision to make.